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ABSTRACT
SITUATED M O D ELIN G  OF EPISTEM IC PUZZLES
Murat Ersan
M.S. in Computer Engineering and Information Science 
Advisor: Assoc. Prof. Varol Akman 
July, 1994
Situation theory is a mathematical theory of meaning introduced by Jon Bar- 
wise and John Perry. It has evoked great theoretical and practical interest 
and motivated the framework of a few ‘computational’ systems. PROSIT is 
the pioneering work in this direction. Unfortunately, there is a lack of real- 
life applications on these systems and this study is a preliminary attempt to 
remedy this deficiency. Here, we examine how much PROSIT reflects situation- 
theoretic concepts and solve a group of epistemic puzzles, using the constructs 
provided by this programming language.
Keywords: Epistemic Puzzles, (Computational) Situation Theory, PROSIT, 
Knowledge Representation, Commonsense Reasoning.
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EPISTEM IK B U LM ACALAR IN  DURUM SAL  
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Murat Ersan
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Danışman: Doç. Dr. Varol Akman 
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Durum kuramı Jon Barwise ve John Perry tarafından önerilmiş ve anlam 
üzerine matematiksel bir kuramdır. Bu kuram kuramsal ve pratik ilgi uyandır­
mış ve bir takım ‘hesapsa!’ sistemlerin çerçevesini güdülendirmiştir. PROSIT 
bu konuda yapılmış öncü bir çalışmadır. Ne yazık ki, bu sistemlerde gerçek 
yaşamdan uygulamalarda eksiklikler vardır ve bu çalışma bu eksikliği gider­
meyi hedeflemektedir. Burada, PROSIT’ in durum kuramının kavramlarını ne 
denli yansıttığını inceliyor ve bu programlama dilini kullanarak bir dizi epis- 
temik bulmacayı çözüyoruz.
Anahtar Sözcükler: Epistemik Bulmacalar, (Hesapsal) Durum Kuramı, PROSIT, 
Bilgi Gösterimi, Sağduyusal Akıl Yürütme.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Situation theory is a principled programme to develop a mathematical theory 
of meaning which aims to clarify and resolve some tough problems in the study 
of language, information, logic, and philosophy [7]. It was introduced by Jon 
Barwise and John Perry and stimulated great interest [8]. The theory matured 
within the last ten years or so [5, 14, 15, 36. 52, 53] and various versions of 
it have been applied to a number of linguistic issues [17], resulting in what is 
commonly known as situation semantics. This was followed by assorted studies 
on the computational aspects of the theory, which gave birth to a group of 
computational systems based on situation theory [31, 32, 35, 44, 48, 46, 50, 49, 
9, 10].
PROSIT (PROgramming in Situation Theory), developed by Nakashirna 
et al. [31, 32, 35], is the pioneering work in this direction. Therefore, it is 
worth examining how much PROSIT reflects situation-theoretic concepts and 
how much it deviates from them. PROSIT seems to be especially suitable 
for writing programs simulating human-like (commonsense) reasoning [28, 29]. 
Unfortunately, there have been very few attempts to employ PROSIT in this 
style. Such a study is, however, of great importance, and would help us see 
where and why we should utilize systems based on situation theory, and how 
we should go about formulating a situation-theoretic programming paradigm 
[48, 46]. In fact, as far as we know, the only remarkable application in which 
PROSIT has been effectively exploited is the "Three Wisemen Problem” [31]. 
This is a problem involving common knowledge (mutual information) in a 
multi-agent setting. Pinning our faith upon situation theory, we tried to make
1
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use of PROSIT in the solution of what we came to call ‘epistemic puzzles’ 
[19, 26, 30, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42]. Throughout this thesis the nature of epistemic 
puzzles and their solution via a situation-theoretic world-view will be analyzed.
A short introduction to situation theoi'y and situation semantics, and two 
other computational systems (ASTL and BABY-SIT) will be offered in the next 
two chapters, respectively. This is followed by a detailed review of PROSIT, 
where a section is devoted to the comparison of PROSIT and bona fide situation 
theory. The fifth chapter explains what epistemic puzzles look like, how they 
have been solved using classical approaches, and why the situated model fits 
best to model and solve these puzzles. The discussion is supported with a great 
variety of puzzles, some of which are introduced by Raymond Smullyan in his 
book Forever Undecided: A Puzzle Guide to Gödel [42]. (Also cf. [38, 39, 40] 
for similar puzzles.) The discussion ends with a conclusion and proposed future 
work.
Situation Theory and Situation 
Semantics
Chapter 2
Situation theory is a mathematical theory of meaning. It was introduced by 
Barwise and Perry in their book Situations and Attitudes [8] and evoked great 
theoretical and practical interest.
Barwise and Perry were aware of the limitations of classical logic and con­
tended that the standard view of logic is inappropriate for many of the uses to 
which it has been put by semanticists. There have been different approaches to 
building theories of natural language. Some of these theories emphasized the 
power of language to classify minds, i.e., the mental significance of language, 
while others focused on the connections between language and the described 
world, i.e., the external significance of language. However, Barwise and Perry 
claim that for an expression to have meaning, it should convey information. 
This is possible, only if the expressions have a link with the kinds of events 
they describe and also a link with the states of mind. They develop a the­
ory of situations and of meaning as a relation between situations. The theory 
provides a system of abstract objects that help describe the meaning of both 
expressions and mental states in terms of the information they carry about the 
external world.
Keith Devlin [17], who spared considerable effort on the formalization of 
the theory, also regards situation theory as a theory of information. Rather 
than try to define information, he investigated the nature of information flow
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[18] and the mechanisms that gave rise to such flow.
The evolution of situation theory can be regarded as a move away from 
conventional logics which only have relatively simple objects in the semantic 
domain to more complex semantic objects. Within this movement, although 
at the beginning there was little distinction, today there is a split between sit­
uation theory— the formal aspects of the theory, such as mathematical, logical, 
philosophical, proof theoretic, etc.—and situation semantics— the application 
of situation theory to the semantics of natural language.
The information-based approach to the semantics of natural languages has 
resulted in what is known as situation semantics. The primary idea situation 
semantics is based on is that language is used to convey information about 
the world. Two sentences with the same interpretation—describing the same 
situation— can carry different information. Context-dependence, which was 
underestimated in classical approaches to semantics, is the essential hypothesis 
of situation semantics. Indexicals, demonstratives, tenses, and other linguistic 
devices rely heavily on context for their interpretation [1]. Therefore, a sentence 
can be used over and over again in different situations to say different things. Its 
interpretation is subordinate to the situation in which the sentence is uttered.
The framework of situation theory mainly consists of the things an (intel­
ligent) agent is able to discriminate using his cognitive abilities. The basic 
ingredients of this framework are
• Individuals, which are considered as entities that are individuated as 
‘objects’
• Properties that hold or fail to hold for some of these individuals
• Relations that hold or fail to hold among some of those individuals
• Spatial and temporal locations that are points in regions of space and 
time.
The two major notions of situation theory are infons and situations. Infons are 
the basic informational units. They should be considered as discrete items of 
information. Infons are denoted as <C P, Oi,. . .  a^,f where P is an n-place 
relation, a i , . . . a „  are objects appropriate for the respective argument places
CHAPTER 2. SITUATION THEORY AND SITUATION SEMANTICS 5
of P, and i is the polarity (0 or 1). It is possible to use spatial and temporal 
locations in the argument places of relations. The following infon states the 
fact that Bob is married to Carol at time t:
<Cniarried-to, Bob ,C arol,t,l^
Situations are ‘ first-class’ citizens of the theory. There is no clear-cut defi­
nition of what a situation exactly is. Rather, a situation is considered to be a 
structured part of the Reality that a cognitive agent somehow manages to pick 
out (individuate). Situations support facts:
s supports a; (s 1= q ) means that a is an infon that is true of 
situation 5.
A simple example would be 
Si |=-Crunning,Bob,l>
which states that Bob is running in situation Si.
One should note that the truth or falsity of a fact does not depend on the 
supports relation but is handled by the notion of polarity. Therefore
Si [i>^<;running,Bob,l>
does not imply
Si |=:<running,Bob,0>
One of the primary motivations for situation theory was sentences of the 
form
Bob is angry.
Bob is angry and Bob is shouting or Bob is not shouting.
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In conventional classical logic there is no way to distinguish between these two 
sentences. They are considered to be logically equivalent, because any truth 
assignment that makes the former true will also make the latter true. How­
ever, intuitively there seems to be a difference. In situation theory situations 
are partial, i.e., they do not define the truth or falsity of all relations on all ob­
jects in the domain. Permitting partiality, the theory can distinguish between 
those sentences that look logically equivalent. In situation semantics these two 
sentences will have different interpretations. The first one wilt be represented 
by a situation, S, in which Bob is angry. S does not state anything about 
(is not aware of) Bob’s shouting or not. Another situation. S', represents the 
second sentence. S' is the ‘union’ of two situations: the situation in which 
Bob is angry and shouting, and the situation in which Bob is angry and not 
shouting.
It is desirable to have some computational tools to handle situations. Ab­
stract situations are the mathematical constructs with which we can model 
analogs of real situations. They are more amenable to mathematical manip­
ulation. An abstract situation is defined to be a set of infons. Given a real 
situation s the set {a  | s a } is the corresponding abstract situation.
An important feature of situation theory is the existence of types. Types 
are higher-order uniformities which cut across individuals, relations, situations, 
and spatial and temporal locations. Just as individuals, temporal locations, 
spatial locations, relations, and situations, types are also discriminated by 
cognitive agents. In this framework, relations may have their argument places 
filled either with individuals, situations, locations, and other relations or with 
types of individuals, situations, locations, and relations. For example, if an 
agent sees smoke he can conclude that there is fire. For he is aware of the 
constraint which links situations where there is smoke to those where there is 
fire. Thus, the constraint links types of situations, viz. smoky-type of situations 
to ones with fire.
The development of types brings the requirement of devices for making 
reference to arbitrary objects of a given type. Therefore for each type T, an in­
finite collection of parameters T\, 1\, . . .  is introduced. For example IND3 is an 
/A^Z)-parameter (parameters of type IND). Given a 5/T-parameter, STT, and 
a set of infons, I, the following denotes a situation-type, the type of situation
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in which conditions in /  are satisfied:
[SIT, I SITi 1= /]
For example,
[SITi I SITi |=<Crunning,Bob,LC)Ci,77Mi, 1>]
denotes the type of situation in which Bob is running at some location and at 
some time. These parameters already carry some computational power, but 
we need more than that. Rather than parameters ranging over all individuals, 
we need parameters that range over a more limited class. Such parameters are 
called restricted parameters. Given a basic parameter, v, and a condition, C, 
on V,  a restricted parameter u | C is defined. This is of the same basic type 
as V and satisfies the requirements imposed by C. For example,
b =  IND2 K football, IND2, 1 >
a =  IND3 t {<Cman, /yVDa, 1 > , <kicking, IND3, 6, ! > }
Once defined, b ranges over all footballs and a over all men kicking footballs.
In addition, it is possible to obtain new types using a parameter, s, and a 
set, / ,  of infons (in the form [s | s |= /]). For example,
[SITi I SITi H < k ick in g ,a ,M > ]
represents a situation-type where a man is kicking a football and
[a I SITi |=<kicking, a ,6 ,1> ]
denotes the type of men kicking a football.
In situation theory, the flow of information is realized by a certain group of 
infons called constraints. A situation s will carry information relative to the 
constraint C = [S ^  5’'], if s : 5'[/], where /  anchors the parameters in S and
S'. Hence, the information carried by s relative to C is that there is a situation 
s', possibly extending s, of type S'[f].
This introduction on situation theory and situation semantics will be fin­
ished by a previous example about constraints.
50 =  [io I s'o |=<Csmoke-present,/, t, l;>]
51 =  [s'l I s\ |=<Cfire-present,/, 1 » ]
C =  [5o 5i],
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In this example, C is a constraint that links situations where there is fire. Si, 
to situations where there is smoke. So- An agent who is aware of (attuned to) 
this constraint will infer that there is a fire whenever he perceives smoke.
Chapter 3
Computational Situation Theory
Currently, there are three systems based on situation theory. PROSIT, devel­
oped by Nakashima et al. [31, 32, 35], is the pioneering work in this direction. 
This was followed by the development of ASTL by Black [9, 10]. Another 
computational medium based on situations called BABY-SIT is currently be­
ing built at Bilkent University by Akman and Tin [44, 48, 46]. PROSIT is 
primarily aimed at general problems of knowledge representation, while ASTL 
is developed for experiments in natural language processing. On the other 
hand, BABY-SIT will hopefully handle problems of both sorts. In the follow­
ing sections brief explanations of ASTL and BABY-SIT will be given. Because 
the epistemic puzzles in this thesis are implemented on PROSIT, a separate 
chapter is devoted to explain that language.
3.1 ASTL
ASTL (A Situation Theoretic Language) is a situation theoretic language devel­
oped by Alan Black in 1991. It was primarily designed to make experiments on 
semantic theories of natural language. Black chose situation theory as a basis 
for his system because it provides a general and potentially powerful formalism 
on which theories of natural language processing could be implemented. The 
system consists of an interpreter (implemented in Common Lisp) that passes 
over the ASTL definitions to make inference and answer queries about a set of 
constraints and basic situations.
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3.1.1 Syntax and Semantics of ASTL
Similar to many logic programming languages, ASTL has a syntax that consists 
of terms and sentences. Terms can be simple or complex. Simple terms are 
used to denote individuals (e.g., a, b), relations (e.g., happy, see), parameters 
(e.g., X, Y), and variables (e.g., *P, *R). Complex terms are built up from 
simple terms. The complex terms and their notations are as follows.
I-terms are used to represent the basic informational units, i.e., infons. The 
syntax is « r e l ,  argi, . . . ,  arçn·,p o la rity»  where rel is a relation of arity n, argi 
to argn are the terms that stand for the arguments of the relation, and polarity 
denotes the polarity of the infon. For example, an infon stating the fact that 
Bob is singing may be represented by the following i-term;
<<singing,bob,1>>
Types are complex terms denoting the types of situations. They are rep­
resented as [.parameter ! conditiorii. . .  conditionné where each condition has 
the form parameter ! = i-term. For example, the following represents a situation 
type where Bob is happy and Carol is sad.
[S ! S != «h ap p y ,b ob , 1 »
S != <<sad,carol,1>>]
Situations are represented by atomic names which are optionally followed 
by a type (separated by a double colon). An example for a situation would be
S m  : :  [S ! S != «h ap p y ,b ob , 1 »
S != <<sm iling,bob, 1 » ]
Here SITl is of type S, i.e., it is a situation where Bob is happy and smiling.
ASTL sentences are defined using the simple and complex terms. It should 
be noted however, that sentences are distinct from terms and cannot be used 
as arguments to relations. The following are some of the basic ASTL sentence 
types.
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Propositions are situation names followed by types, separated by a single 
colon. For example,
SIT2 : [S ! S != <<happy,bob, 1 »
S != <<happy,carol,1>>]
indicates that both Bob and Carol are happy in situation SIT2.
Constraints are the primary tools that are used in inferencing. They are de­
fined between propositions, and are of the form sito : typco <= siti : typei, . . . ,  sitn 
typtn where each sit{ is a situation name or a variable and typci is a type. The 
following example demonstrates a constraint which states that whenever Bob 
is smiling, he is happy:
♦S : [S ! S != <<happy,bob, 1 » ]
<=
*S : [S ! S != <<smiling,bob,1>>]
Grammar rules are a special kind of constraints and have a similar seman­
tics. They are of the form sito : typeo ~> siti : typei,. . .  ,sitn · typen. An 
example is
*S : [S ! S != <<category,*S,Sentence, 1 » ]
->
*NP : [S ! S != <<category,*NP,NounPhrase,1>>] ,
*VP : [S ! S != <<category,*VP,VerbPhrase,1>>].
This grammar rule should be interpreted as follows: if there is a situation 
*NP of the given type and a situation *VP of the given type then there is also 
a situation *S of the given type.
3.1.2 Inference in ASTL
The primary sentences used to make inference are the constraints. ASTL 
has five inference rules using which it answers non-trivial questions about the
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described models. The following paragraphs explain these inference rules and 
offer examples.
Type reduction aims to break down a type with more than one condition 
into pieces. For example the situation
S IT l : [S ! S != « h a p p y , bob, 1 »
S != < < sin g in g ,b o b ,1> > ]
is also a situation of the following types:
S IT l : [S ! S != « h a p p y , bob, 1 » ]
S IT l : [S ! S != « s i n g i n g ,b o b ,1 » ]
Type combination is the reverse of type reduction, i.e., it combines single 
condition propositions of the same situation. For example, if the following 
propositions are true
S IT l : [S ! S != « h a p p y , bob, 1 » ]
S IT l : [S ! S != « d a n c in g ,b o b , 1 »
S != < < sin g in g ,b o b ,1> > ]
then the following proposition is also true
SITl : [ S I S  
S 
S
= <<happy ,bob, 1 »
= <<dancing,bob,1>> 
= <<singing,bob,1>>]
Modus ponens derives the conclusion of a constraint if the premise(s) is 
(are) satisfied. So, if we have a constraint and a proposition such as
SITl : [S ! S != «happy,bob, 1»]
<=
SIT2 : [S ! S != «singing,bob,1»]
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SIT2 : [S ! S != « s in g in g ,b o b , 1 » ]
then ASTL deduces the following proposition
S IT l : [S ! S != « h a p p y , bob, 1 » ]
Argument promotion allows the proper treatment of typed situations as 
arguments in facts. For example, using the following constraint and proposition
SITO : [S ! S != « h a p p y , bob, 1 » ]
<=
SITl : [S ! S !=  « s e e s ,b o b ,
SIT2 : :  [S ! S != <<happy, c a r o l , 1 > > ], 1>>]
S IT l : [S ! S != « s e e s ,b o b ,S I T 2 ,1 » ]
it is possible to deduce the following constraint
SITO : [S ! S != « h a p p y , bob, 1 » ]
<=
SIT2 : [S ! S != <<hap p y,carol, 1 » ]
ASTL also has a mechanism to handle cyclic constraint definitions. It is 
possible to deduce
S IT l : [S ! S != <<happy,bob, 1 » ]
using the following constraint and proposition:
♦S : [S ! S != <<happy,bob, 1 »]
<=
*S : [S ! S != <<sees,bob,*S,l>> 
S != <<happy,carol,1>>]
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SITl : [S ! S != « s e e s ,b o b ,SITl, 1 »  
S != <<happ y,carol,1>>]
3.1.3 Applications
Sentences are parsed in ASTL accoi’ding to the situation theoretic grammar 
(STG) described by Cooper [13], and situation-theoretic I'epi'esentations of 
them are built. In this grammar, situations are used to represent actual ut­
terances. These are called utterance situations. Using utterance situations it 
is possible to write situation-theoretic constraints. Because ASTL is aimed 
at natural language processing, it has special constructs to handle utterance 
situations. Rather than using constraints and fully specifying all connections 
in an utterance, i.e., the order of words, grammar rules are used. Grammar 
rules are a special form of constraints which are more compact and are more 
efficient to use.
For example, the following constraint states that, if there is a situation that 
supports the fact that it is a noun phrase, and a situation that is a verb phrase, 
and that the noun phrase is connected to a point which the verb phrase starts 
from (*Mid), then there is a situation which is a sentence:
*S : [S ! S != <<category,S,Sentence,1>>
S != <<connected,S,*Start,*End, 1 »  
S != <<uttsit,S,l>>
S != <<daughters,S,*NP,*VP,l>>]
<=
*NP
♦VP
[S ! S != «category,S,NounPhrase, 1 »]
S != <<uttsit,S,l»
S != <<connected,S,*Start,*Mid,l>> 
[S ! S != <<category,S,VerbPhrase,l>>]
S != <<uttsit,S, 1 »
S != <<connected,S,*Mid,*End,l»
On the other hand, using grammar rules it is easier to represent the same 
constraint as,
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*S : [S ! S != <<category,S,Sentence,1>>
S != «daughters,S,*NP,*VP,1>>]
->
*NP : [S ! S != <<category,S,NounPhrase, 1 » ]
*VP : [S ! S != <<category,S,VerbPhrase,l>>]
ASTL has been used as a meta-language for several important semantic the­
ories. One of these semantic theories is the Discourse Representation Theory 
(DRT) by Kamp [25], that introduces the notion of discourse representation 
structure which can be considered as representing states in the discourse. An­
other one is the Dyncimic Predicate Logic (DPL) [20] which views semantics of 
an expression as a relation between an input state and an output state. These 
semantic theories have been implemented and have been compared using the 
constructs of ASTL. Although ASTL reflects a small part of situation theory, 
i.e., infons, situations, and constraints, it has been successful enough to offer 
useful ideas.
3.2 BABY-SIT
BABY-SIT is a computational medium based on situations. It is currently 
being developed at Bilkent University in KEE^^ (Knowledge Engineering En­
vironment) on a SPARCstation^^. BABY-SIT is mainly aimed at developing 
and testing programs in domains ranging from linguistics to artificial intelli­
gence within a framework built upon situation theoretic constructs.
3.2.1 Syntax and Semantics
The computational model of BABY-SIT consists of nine primitive domains: 
individuals, times, places, relations, polarities, parameters, infons, situations, 
and types. Each of these primitive domains has its own internal structure. 
Individuals are unique atomic entities. They correspond to the objects in the 
world. Times are used to represent temporal locations and are a distinguished
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type of individuals. Similar to times, places are individuals that represent spa­
tial locations. Relations correspond to relations that hold between objects in 
the world. They have certain argument roles which must be occupied by ap­
propriate objects. Polarities represent the truth values of relations. Infons are 
discrete items of information and are of the form <<rel,argi, . . .  ,argn,pol>>, 
where rel is a relation, argi, 1 < ¿ < n is an object of the appropriate type 
for the ¿th argument role, and pol is the polarity. Parameters are ‘place hold­
ers’ of the objects in the model. Using parameters one can refer to arbitrary 
objects of a given type. (Abstract) situations are sets of parametric infons. 
Types are higher-order uniformities that individuate (discriminate) objects in 
the world. BABY-SIT offers nine primitive types: ~IND (individuals), ~TIM  
(times), ~L0C (places), ~REL (relations), ~P0L (polarities), ~INF (infons), 
~PAR (parameters), ~ S IT  (situations), and ~TYP (types).
BABY-SIT offers two modes of interaction with the system. The assertion 
mode provides an interactive environment where one can define objects and 
their types, and assert infons into situations. The query mode enables one to 
issue queries about the existing situations.
In the following example, it is asserted that bob and mary are individuals, 
lo v e s  is a relation, and s i t l  is a situation. I> is the prompt of the assertion 
mode:
I> bob: ~IND 
I> mary: ~IND 
I> lo v e s : ~REL 
I> s i t l :  ~ S IT
To state the fact that Bob loves Mary in a situation the following assertion is 
made:
I> s i t l  1= <<loves,bob ,m ary ,1>>
Queries are handled by either direct querying through situations, i.e., using 
the existing infons in situations, or by the application of backward-chaining 
constraints (explained in the next section). BABY-SIT offers different types 
of queries that can be controlled by the user:
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• Searching for solutions by using a given group of constraints.
• Replacing each parameter in the query expression by the corresponding 
individual if there is a possible anchor.
• Returning a specified number of solutions.
• Displaying solutions with the parameters replaced with the corresponding 
individuals.
• Displaying a trace of the anchoring of parameters in each solution.
A simple query asking for the person Bob loves would be
Q> sitl 1= <<loves,bob,?X,1>>
to which the system will respond
sitl 1= <<loves,bob,mary,1>>
3.2.2 Inference
In BABY-SIT, inference is made via constraints. Constraints can be forward­
chaining, backward-chaining, and both forward- and backward-chaining. Each 
constraint has an identifier and is a member of a group of constraints. The 
following constraint has the identifier BEING and is a member of the constraint 
group BEING-PERSPECTIVE. It states that every man is a human.
BEING-PERSPECTIVE:
BEING:
?S 1= <<human,?X,1>>
<=
?S 1= « m a n , ? X , l »
Constraints can be either global or situated; i.e., they can be applied to all 
situations or to a specific one. It is also possible to add some background
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constraints which must be satisfied for the constraint to apply. For example, 
the following constraint states that balls fall if they are not supported, but 
only if there is gravity:
NATURAL-LAW-PERSPECTIVE:
FALLING-BALL:
?S1 1= « b a l I , ? X , l » ,
?S1 1= <<supported,?X,0>>
=>
?S2 1= « f a I I s , ? X , l »
UNDER-CONDITIONS: 
w: {<<exists .gravity, 1 » }
(w denotes the background situation.) This is the situation from which all the 
other real-life situations normally inherit.
Forward chaining constraints are activated whenever their antecedents are 
satisfied. All the consequences are then asserted. New assertions may in turn 
activate other forward chaining constraints. A backward chaining constraint is 
activated when a query is made about its consequence. The system then tries 
to satisfy all the antecedents of the constraint.
3.2.3 Applications
BABY-SIT has been used to resolve pronominal anaphoric expressions in Turk­
ish [50]. This process can be defined as finding the antecedent and referent of 
an anaphoric expression. Consider the following examples:
(1) Bilge bana [0 hastalandığmj-ı söyledi.
(2) Erol maça gelmeyecek. Bilge bana [0 hastalandığınj-ı söyledi.
In the first example, the zero anaphor expression, 0, being the subject of the 
embedded sentence will take the subject of the main sentence. Bilge, as its
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antecedent. However, in the second example, the first sentence supplying the 
context, the antecedent of the zero anaphor is the subject of the previous 
sentence, i.e., Erol.
As a starting point, the existing syntactic approaches to resolve pronominal 
anaphora for isolated sentences has been implemented in BABY-SIT. This was 
followed by the generation of simple syntactic rules to resolve the issue across 
sentence boundaries. An example for such a rule would be: “if the subject of 
the main sentence is represented by a zero pronoun, then it co-refers with the 
subject of the immediately preceding sentence.”
The procedure BABY-SIT follows in resolving anaphora can be summarized 
as follows. Each linguistic expression is considered as an utterance situation. 
Therefore, for each linguistic expression in a sentence type of utterance situa­
tion is defined. The situation that represents the whole sentence is designated 
by the composition of the situations of its sub-utterances. There is also a group 
of constraints that place restriction on the existing environment. An example 
for such a constraint would be: “if there is an utterance situation of the word 
‘AYNUR’, then it must represent a female human being.” Additionally, there 
is a background situation that contains information about the utterer and the 
addressee. After all the utterance situations are asserted and the constraints 
are satisfied, rules that encode syntactic control of zero anaphora are exploited 
to resolve the anaphora.
BABY-SIT has also been used to implement the causal theories of Shoham 
[37], and their extensions proposed by Tin and Akman [45]. These theories 
were tested on a group of problems, one of which is the famous Yale Shooting 
Problem (YSP). This is a puzzle proposed by Hanks and McDermott [21] as a 
paradigm to show how the temporal projection problem arises:
At some point in time, a person, Fred, is alive. A loaded gun, after 
waiting for a while, is fired at Fred. What are the results of this 
action?
One expects that Fred would die and that the gun would be unloaded after 
the firing. But Hanks and McDermott [22] demonstrate in the framework of 
(among other formalisms) circumscription, that unintended minimal models
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are obtained; the gun gets unloaded during the waiting stage and firing the 
gun does not kill Fred.
Causal theories try to reason about the effects of such actions. Proceeding 
in time, the causal inference mechanism tries to obtain knowledge about future 
using what is known (and what is not known) about the past. The axioms of 
causal theories are translated into infons and constraints in BABY-SIT. For 
example, the following constraint is, in fact, the translation of the axiom stating 
that if a gun is loaded at some point in time it will continue to be loaded unless 
someone fires it or manually empties it:
GUNFIRE:
R3:
?S1 1= «loaded,?G, 1 »
=>
?S3 1= «loaded, ?G,1>>,
?S1 1= <<successor,?S3,?Sl,1>>
UNDER-CONDITIONS:
?S1: { « f  ires,?M,?G,0>>,
<<emptied-man.ually,?G,0>>,
<<successor,?S2,?Sl,0>>}
Both Shoham’s causal theories, and Tin and Akman’s [47] extensions that 
permit simultaneity have been successfully modeled and compared in BABY­
SIT.
Chapter 4
PROSIT
PROSIT [31, 32, 35] is a declarative language in which both programs and 
data are just sets of infons. This feature makes PROSIT akin to Prolog, but 
PROSIT is based on situation theory rather than Horn clauses. The motivation 
behind the design of this language rests on the following desirable features, each 
of which is supported by the theory:
• The use of partially specified objects and partial information
• Situations as first-class citizens
• Situatedness of information and constraints
• Informational constraints
• Self-referential expressions
These features provide the necessary power to analyze semantic phenomena 
in natural language. PROSIT also offers tools for knowledge representation, 
interactive querying, and deduction, which are important components of a 
programming environment.
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4.1 Syntax and Semantics
Expressions in PROSIT are either atoms or lists. Atoms that are numbers (2 , 
3 . 5 ,  5 2 7 , etc.) or strings ( ' ' h e l l o ' ' ,  ' ' e n t e r ' ' ,  etc.) are considered to 
be constants, whereas atoms that are symbols (FOO, *A, B44, etc.) are re­
garded either as parameters or variables. Lists are similar to Lisp lists, i.e., they 
are a series of atoms or lists separated by spaces and enclosed by parentheses, 
as in (A (B C (D)) E).
Parameters are Lisp symbols starting with a character other than .They 
are used to represent things that cannot be captured by PROSIT constants, 
such as objects, situations, and relations. Usually, different parameters cor­
respond to different entities. Parameters can be used in any infon (including 
queries and constraints); their scope is global.
Symbols starting with are variables. Variables are place-holders that 
stand for any PROSIT expression. They only appear in queries and constraints; 
their scope is local to the constraint or quer}·’ they participate in. If a variable is 
bound to a certain value, then in the later parts of the same constraint or query, 
those variables are replaced with their value unless the system backtracks.
In PROSIT, an infon is represented as a list whose first element is the 
symbol for a relation and whose remaining elements are the objects for which 
the relation holds:
(relation objecti . . .  ob ject)
For example, the infon
( lis te n in g -to  John Mary)
expresses that the relation lis ten in g jto  holds between the objects represented 
by the parameters John and Mary, i.e., .John is listening to Mary.
One can assert infons, and query a knowledge base incorporating, among 
other things, infons. Unlike Prolog, all infons are local to situations. For exam­
ple, to assert the infon mentioned above into a situation, s i t l ,  the following 
expression is used:
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( !=  s i t !  ( lis te n in g jto  John Mary))
In PROSIT, there exists a tree hierarchy among all situations, with the 
situation top at the root of the tree, top is the global situation and the 
‘owner’ of all the other situations generated. One can traverse the ‘situation 
tree’ using the predicates in and out. Although it is possible to issue queries 
from any situation about any other situation, the result will depend on where 
the query is made. If a situation s it2  is defined in the current situation, say 
s i t l ,  then s i t l  is said to be the owner of s it2 , or equivalently:
• s i t 2 is a part of s i t l ,  or
• s i t l  describes s i t 2
The owner relation states that if (!=  s it2  in f on) holds in s i t l ,  then in f on 
holds in s it2 , and conversely, if in f on holds in s it2  then (!=  s it2  in f on) 
holds in s i t l .
in causes the interpreter to go to a specified situation which will be a part 
of the ‘current situation’ (the situation in which the predicate is called), out 
causes the interpreter to go to the owner of the current situation.
Similar to the owner relation there is the ‘subchunk’ relation, denoted by 
([_  s i t l  s it2 ) ,  where s i t l  is a subchunk of s it2 , and conversely, s it2  is 
a ‘superchunk’ of s i t l .  When s i t l  is asserted to be the subchunk of s it2  it 
means that s i t l  is totally described by s it2 . A superchunk is like an owner 
(except that out will always cause the interpreter to go to the owner, not to a 
superchunk).
PROSIT has two more relations that can be defined between situations. 
These are the ‘subtype’ and the ‘subsituation’ relations. When the subtype re­
lation, denoted by (@< s i t l  s it2 ) ) ,  is asserted, it causes the current situation 
to describe that s it2  supports each infon valid in s i t l  and that s it2  respects 
every constraint that is respected by s i t l ,  i.e., s i t l  becomes a subtype of 
s it2 . The subsituation relation, denoted by (<— s i t l  s it2 ) ,  is the same 
as (Q< s i t l  s it2 ) except that only infons, but no constraints, are inherited. 
Both relations are transitive.
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A distinguishing feature of PROSIT is that the language allows circularity 
[6]. The fact that PROSIT permits situations as arguments to infons makes 
it possible to write self-referential statements. Consider a card game (s it )  
between two players. John has the ace of spades and Mary has the queen 
of spades. When both players display their cards the following infons will be 
factual:
sit (has John ace_of.spades)) 
sit (has Mary queen.of.spades) ) 
sit (sees John sit)) 
sit (sees Mary sit))
In this example the third and the fourth infons are circular, viz. s i t  supports 
facts in which it appears as an argument.
4.2 Inference
The notion of informational constraints is a distinguishing h iture that shaped 
the design of PROSIT. Constraints can be considered as spc iai types of infor­
mation that ‘generate’ new facts. They are just a special c tse of infons, and 
therefore, are also situated. A constraint can be specified using either of the 
three relations =>, <=, and <=>. Constraints specified with => are forward­
chaining. They are of the form (=> fact headi head2 ...h^adn). If fact is 
asserted to the situation then all of the head facts are also asserted to that 
situation. Constraints specified with <= are backward-chaining. They are of 
the form (<= head facti fact2 .. .factn). If each of the facts from 1 to n are sup­
ported by the situation, then head is also supported (though not asserted) by 
the same situation. Finally, constraints specified with <=> should be considered 
as both backward- and forward-chaining.
If there is a constraint stating that “everything that smiles is happy” in 
situation s i t l ,
(resp sitl (=> (smiles *X) (happy *X)))
then the assertion of
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(smiles John)
in s i t l  will force PROSIT to assert the following in s i t l ,  too:
(happy John)
When an expression, expr, is queried, PROSIT tries to evaluate the query, 
binding values to the variables in the query as the interpreter goes through the 
database. If this process fails at any stage, PROSIT backtracks to the previous 
stage in the search of a solution, and undoes all the bindings made along the 
incorrect path. The search will succeed in two cases:
1. expr unifies with an expression that is explicitly asserted in the current 
situation or its subsituations.
2. expr unifies with the head of a backward-chaining constraint (<= head 
facti fact2 ...factn) and finds a solution to all of facti fact2 ...factn, 
when queried in order.
PROSIT offers two types of unification. One is variable unification (V- 
unification), the other is parameter unification (P-unification). V-unification 
is the one familiar from Prolog and binds variables to objects. It occurs only 
in the query mode and its effects are undone when PROSIT backtracks. P- 
unification occurs only in the assertion mode. It is performed by explicitly 
stating that two parameters stand for the same object and can be unified. P- 
unification is one of the major differences between PROSIT and Prolog [12] in 
which atoms never unify.
PROSIT’s querying mechanism is flexible. It is possible to use a variable 
in any part of a query, even in the predicate name or the entire query.
4.3 Applications
Although it offers a variety of constructs that can be used in inferencing for 
human-like reasoning, there have been few attempts to employ PROSIT in this
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style. One of the applications in which PROSIT was used is the treatment of 
identity. This aims to demonstrate the role of parameters in situation theory.
Parameters are means to keep track of the correspondence between the 
concepts in mind and real objects in the world, cf. Israel and Perry [24]. The 
idea can be exemplified by the discussion about Cicero. The famous Roman 
orator Cicero’s first name is Tull}^ For someone who knows this identity, the 
answer to the question “Is Tully an orator?” would be yes. However, it is not 
possible to give the same answer for someone who is not aware of this identity.
In PROSIT, it is possible to express the difference between someone who 
knows the identity of Cicero and Tully, and someone who does not. PROSIT 
overcomes this identity problem by allowing assertions of situation-dependent 
equalities between parameters. This is done by P-unifying two objects.
If an individual is aware of the identity of Cicero and Tully, his knowl­
edge will be classified by the situational parameter s i t l  which supports the 
following facts.
·(!= sitl (= cicero tully))
(!= sitl (orator cicero))
Here, the former is a P-unification which states that Cicero and Tully are the 
same person; the latter states that Cicero is an orator.
On the other hand, the knowledge of someone who does not know this 
identity is classified by s it2  where
(!= sit2 (orator cicero))
When asked the same questions in the two situations the system will re­
spond
(!= sitl (orator tully)) 
y e s .
(!= sit2 (orator tully)) 
unknown.
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A study on communication and inference through situations by Nakashima 
et al. [31], was the most serious attempt to make use of PROSIT. The study 
was mainly aimed to solve a problem that requires the cooperation of a group 
of agents in a multi-agent setting. Situation theory was used as a framework 
to represent common knowledge [3]. The idea behind this choice was to exploit 
the foundations of situation theory for analyzing information flow. Situation- 
theoretic principles were used to solve the “Three Wisemen Problem” [31] 
which will be covered in the next chapter.
4.4 PROSIT versus Situation Theory
The development of programming languages based on situation theory is a new 
trend, so it is worth examining how much PROSIT reflects situation-theoretic 
concepts and how much it deviates from them.
PROSIT represents infons as lists and this is similar to the representation of 
infons in situation theory. PROSIT has no special polarity argument in infons, 
but handles this feature using the predicate no. Thus, (m/on) represents a 
positive infon whereas (no infon) stands for the negation of that infon. The 
only deficiency regarding infons in PROSIT appears in the notion of spatial 
and temporal locations. In PROSIT, it is possible to use location-indicating 
parameters in the argument places of relations, but this would be putting the 
individuals and locations in the same category. However, Devlin [17, p. 35] 
remarks that “ . . .  infons are built up out of entities called relations, individuals, 
locations, and polarities.” Clearly, the majority of real-life facts pertain only 
to a certain region of space and a certain interval of time, and it is desirable 
to handle (spatial and temporal) locations.
PROSIT has situational parameters that are used to model abstract analogs 
of real situations. In that sense, they can be considered as abstract situations. 
They are associated with sets of infons. The definition of supports changes to:
A situation s supports an infon if i is explicitly asserted to hold 
in s or can be proved to hold by application of forward-chaining 
constraints in s.
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As a result, supports reduces to simple set-membership and we can conclude 
that the situations in PROSIT are equivalent to abstract situations. PROSIT 
also supports the concept of constraints, but handles them in a different fash­
ion. These come in three flavors in PROSIT: forward-chaining constraints, 
backward-chaining constraints, and forward- and backward-chaining constraints. 
(This classification is nowhere to be found in situation theory.) Built up on 
this classification, the designers of PROSIT came up with new definitions [32, 
p. 49.3]:
An infon is supported by a situation if [it] is explicitly asserted to 
hold in the situation, or can be proved to hold by application of 
forward-chaining constraints in the situation.
An infon is permitted by a situation if [it] is deduced through ap­
plication of backward-chaining constraints.
It seems that this has no philosophical basis, but is offered because of imple­
mentation requirements. In fact, both methods (forward or backward) result 
in the same answers to queries. However, forward-chaining incurs a high cost 
at assertion-time, and backward-chaining incurs a high cost at query-time. 
Additionally, forward-chaining requires more computer memory. So what the 
expression “an infon is permitted in a situation” really means is that, the in­
fon is supported by the situation but there is either no need or no space to 
store it. On the other hand, if implementation strategies are considered, it is 
a good thing to have such choices. It is left to the user to select what kind of 
constraints to use. For example, forward-chaining constraints can be used in 
applications where results may not be predictable, and backward-chaining can 
be used in diagnostic problems [51]. There are two additional points on which 
the constraints of PROSIT have been criticized (cf. Black [9, 10] and Tin [44]). 
The first point is that PROSIT’s constraints are situated infon constraints, 
i.e., the constraints are about local facts within a situation rather than about 
situation-types. While this criticism seems to be valid, it is possible to simu­
late constraints that are not local to one situation (but are global). This can 
be achieved by introducing a situation which is global to all other situations 
and then asserting the constraint in this global situation. Because all other 
situations will be in this global situation, any constraint that is asserted here 
will apply to all situations. For example.
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(! (resp TopSit
( < =  (!= *Sitl (touching *X *Y))
(!= *Sitl (kissing *X *Y)))))
states that if there is a situation in TopSit that supports a fact about “kiss­
ing,” then that situation also supports a fact about “touching” on the same 
arguments.
The second criticism is that it is not possible to model conventional con­
straints in PROSIT. However, none of the existing systems is capable of per­
forming this either.
Situation theory provides notions such as types and parameters. In PROSIT, 
some of these notions are hard to represent and some are not even possible. 
First of all, there is no typing in PROSIT. A variable can match any parameter 
or constant without due regard to types. In Chapter 2, we have defined 7·! as 
a restricted parameter ranging over all men kicking footballs. Once defined, 
/T will represent this subclass of individuals. But in PROSIT it is not possible 
to make this kind of parameter definitions that can be used throughout a pro­
gram. The only thing one can try is to pose queries on restricted parameters. 
All men kicking footballs can be queried using the following expression:
(AND (kicking *a *b) (man *a) (football *b))
Although none of the variables above is restricted, the expression queries a 
restricted class of individuals.
PROSIT has no mechanism to define types either. As a consequence, there 
is a lack of situation-types. We cannot define a situation-type explicitly, i.e., 
there is no corresponding expression for defining all men kicking footballs. 
On the other hand, PROSIT can query a certain type of situation and put 
constraints between situation-types.
So the problem is that it is not possible to restrict a parameter or to assign 
a variable to a certain type. This also makes it impossible to define argument 
roles. Nevertheless, this deficiency does not prevent us from making queries 
about restricted parameters or enforcing consti'aints between situation-types.
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Recalling the previous section, one may wonder why there are two different 
relations (owner and superchunk) doing very similar jobs. The major differ­
ence between these relations is not what the PROSIT manual [35, p. 15] says,
i.e., that the predicate out will take the interpreter to the owner not to the 
superchunk. More importantly, the owner relation is defined between situa­
tions which are parent-child in the situation tree and the superchunk relation 
between two situations that are siblings in this tree.
The other two relations (subtype and subsituation) should also be exam­
ined carefully. At first glance, it seems that there is a similarity between 
these relations and the concept of inheritance in object-oriented programming 
[11]. However, in PROSIT the supersituation inherits all the infons from the 
subsituation, whereas in object-oriented programming it is the subclass that 
inherits the properties and methods from the superclass. Accordingly, it can 
be concluded that either the direction of inheritance is completely different in 
two paradigms or that the terms subsituation and subclass should not evoke 
object-oriented concepts.
Regarding the question of where one can use these relations, the example 
given in the PROSIT manual [35, p. 2] uses these relations to classify airplanes 
of type DC (DC-9, DC-10, and so on). But from the situation-theoretic point of 
view, it is not correct to consider airplanes of type DC as a situation. An agent 
does not individuate DC type of airplanes as a situation and say, DC-9s as a 
subsituation of that situation. These can only be considered as a class and its 
subclass. This example surely suits well to object-oriented programming, but 
not to situation theory. Accordingly, PROSIT needs to draw a clear distinction 
between situations and classes.
One would be hard-pressed to find anything about inheritance, supersitua­
tions, and subsituations when one reads the essential documents on situation 
theory [8, 5, 17]. The only thing that seems related to these concepts is the 
“part-of” relation which is defined as follows [5, p. 185]:
A situation si is a part of a situation (denoted as si ^ 5 2 ) just 
in case every basic state of affairs that is a fact of Si is also a fact 
of S2 .
However if Siti ^  Sit2 is true, then the only comment we should make is
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that these two are defining the same situation, and that Sit2 offers a more 
fine-grained description (using more infons than Siti).
Chapter 5
Situations and Epistemic Puzzles
5.1 Epistemic Puzzles
Episternic puzzles deal with agents and their knowledge. This can be either in 
the form of individual knowledge or common knowledge (mutual information) 
in a multi-agent setting. The ontology of these puzzles include the agents whose 
knowledge we try to represent, A =  {a, 6 , c , . . . } ,  the knoioledge each agent has, 
K  =  {Kai KhiKci ■ · ■]■, a^ nd the facts mentioned in the statement of the puzzle. 
If we let all the facts in a puzzle make up the set F  =  { / i , / 2 , / 3 , · · ·} (where 
each /, is a relation that holds among the agents and objects that exist in the 
puzzle), then each Ki is a subset of F. The primary question to be answered in 
these epistemic puzzles is generally about the facts that the agents are aware 
of. So a puzzle might ask if an agent, say x, is aware of the fact /,·, i.e., whether 
/ 1  ^ Κχ is true. However, this representation fails to handle two main issues of 
knowledge[3, 6 ]: the circularity of knowledge (i.e., if a knows / 3 , then he knows 
that he knows / 3 ,  ad infinitum) and deductive omniscience (i.e., if a knows 
that p and p entails q, then a knows that q). For this representation to handle 
circularity of knowledge it should be extended such that each Ki is an element 
of itself. So if a knows the facts / 1 ,  / 3 ,  and / 4 ,  then Ka = { f i ,  fs, /4·, Ka}. To 
achieve deductive omniscience the definition of the facts should be extended. 
In addition to simple relations that hold among agents, rules of the form “if 
. . .  then . . . ” should also be considered as facts.
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To elucidate the definitions above, we show how they can be used to rep­
resent common knowledge. In a card game, John has the ace of spades and 
Mary has the queen of spades. Jack comes and looking at her cards announces 
that Mary has the queen of spades. At this point, each agent’s knowledge is 
represented as follows:
К  John — {(has John ace-of-spades), Kjohn-,R<
K .
K.
common }
тагу
common
{ A  тагу) N  common }
=  {(has тагу queen-of-spades), Kcommon)
We now describe, via an example, what an epistemic puzzle looks like [34]:
Two logicians place cards on their foi'eheads so that what is written 
on the card is visible only to the other logician. Consecutive positive 
integers have been written on the cards. The following conversation 
ensues:
A: “I don’t know my number.”
B: “I don’t know my number.”
A: “I don’t know my number.”
B: “I don’t know my number.”
. . .  n statements of ignorance later . . .
A or B: “I know my number.”
What is on the card and how does the logician know it?
Note that the facts that we are after are restricted. We are only interested in 
the numbers on the cards on the foreheads, not in the colors or shapes of the 
cards. Here, both logicians know some facts, and as the conversation proceeds 
they generate new facts. At the end, one of them finds out what the number 
on his forehead is. The aim of this study is to simulate the way the agent holds 
information about the situation he happens to be in and the way he reasons 
about this information.
There have been many attempts in AI to deal with knowledge and infor- 
imition, and the most common tool used in tackling the fundamental problems 
posed by these concepts was classical logic (predicate logic) or extensions of it 
such as modal, temporal, and deontic logics [2, 23, 27]. All these attempts were
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of a strictly mathematical nature, and therefore all were within the existing 
pure mathematics paradigm [5]. On the other hand, situation theory emerged 
as a realistic theory of information. First, an empirical study of information 
was made [17]. This was followed by both the application of the existing math­
ematical techniques and the development of new mathematical tools. In that 
respect, situation theory is tailor-made for problems involving knowledge and 
information.
In the following section, we will compare how the classical approach and 
the situated approach handle epistemic puzzles.
5.2 Previous Approaches
In this section we will examine three different approaches used in solving epis- 
teniic puzzles. First we will analyze how Smullyan solves his famous knights- 
and-knaves puzzles using symbolic logic. In [42], Smullyan introduces a number 
of puzzles about liars and truth-tellers to warm up the layman. Most of the 
events in the puzzles take place on an island, viz., the Island of Knights and 
Knaves. On this imaginary island the following three propositions hold:
1 . Knights always make true statements.
2 . Knaves always make false statements.
3. Every inhabitant is either a knight or a knave.
The aim of the puzzles is to decide whether an inhabitant is a knight or a 
knave using the statements he makes. Assume that P is a native of the Island 
of Knights and Knaves. Let k be the proposition that “P is a knight.” Suppose 
P utters a proposition X . In Smullyan’s puzzles the reasoner knows neither the 
truth value of k nor the truth value of X , i.e., he does not know whether the 
native is a knight or knave, and he does not know if the asserted proposition 
is true or false. The only thing he knows is that P is a knight if and only if 
X  is true. So he knows that the proposition k =  X  \s true. So the sentence 
“P asserts X ” is translated ns k = X . We will show how this fact helps in the 
solution of the problem where the native Pi states that he and his wife, P2 , are
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both knaves. Now, ki is the proposition that Pi is a knight, and -'ki that he 
is a knave. Similarly -'k.2 is the proposition that P2 is a knave. Translating to 
symbolic logic, the reasoner knows that ki =  { - ‘ki A “ ‘Arj). At this point, the 
domain of the problem changes from knowledge to symbolic logic: Given two 
propositions ki and ¿ 2  such that ki =  ( - ' ¿ 1  A ->^ ’2 ), what are the truth values 
of and A-'2 ? Using a truth table one can easily verify that the only case in 
which ki =  {-'ki A - '¿ 2 ) is when ki is false and ^'2 is true.
Although there is a very interesting translation here from the domain of 
knowledge to the domain of symbolic logic, the question “Is this the way an in­
telligent agent handles such problems?” should be carefully considered. Would 
an intelligent agent use a truth table to decide who is lying and who is telling 
the truth?
In the solutions of some other epistemic puzzles, rather than explaining 
the way an agent reasons throughout the puzzle, it is proven that the final 
result that the agent has reached is correct. For example, in the puzzle about 
cheating husbands this is done using induction [34]:
The queen of the matriarchal city-state of Marnajorca, on the con­
tinent of Atlantis, have a long record of opposing and actively 
fighting the male infidelity problem. Ever since technologically- 
primitive days of Queen Henrietta I, women in Mamajorca have 
been required to be in perfect health and pass an extensive logic 
and puzzle-solving exam before being allowed to take a husband. 
The queens of Mamajorca, however, were not to show such compe­
tence.
It has always been common knowledge among the women of Ma­
majorca that their queens are truthful and that the women are 
obedient to the queens. It was also common knowledge that all 
women hear every shot fired in Mamajorca. Queen Henrietta I 
awoke one morning with a firm resolution to do away with the in­
fidelity problem in Mamajorca. She summoned all of the women 
heads-of-households to the town square and read them the following 
statement:
“There are (one or more) unfaithful husbands in our community. 
Although none of you knew before this gathering whether your
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own husband was faithful, each of you knows which of the other 
husbands are unfaithful. I forbid you to discuss the matter of your 
husbands fidelity with anyone. However, should you discover your 
husband is unfaithful, you must shoot him on the midnight of the 
day you find about it.”
Thirty nine silent nights went by, and on the fortieth night, shots 
were heard. How did the wives decide on the infidelity of their 
husbands?
As a solution to this problem, the theorem stating that if there are n un­
faithful husbands they will be shot on the midnight of the day, is proven. 
For n =  1 there would be one unfaithful husband. His wife would immediately 
realize that he is the unfaithful one, just after hearing the queen’s statement, 
because she definitely knows that there is no other unfaithful husband. Assume 
the claim holds for n — k, i.e., if there are k unfaithful husbands they would 
be shot on the k^  ^ night. It could be proven that the claim also holds if there 
are A: -|- 1 unfaithful husbands. In that case, every cheated wife would know 
k unfaithful husbands. As all the cheated wives are logically competent, they 
know that if there are k unfaithful husbands then those husbands will be shot 
on the night. As none of the cheated wives can prove that their husband 
is unfaithful, no shots are fired during the first k nights. Because no shots 
are fired on the k*^  night, the cheated wives decide that there are more than 
k unfaithful husbands and that their own husband is unfaithful too. So the 
unfaithful husbands are shot on the k -f night.
However, rather than explicating how the cheated wives decide that their 
husbands are unfaithful, this proof demonstrates that their decision is correct.
The third approach used in solving these puzzles is the most realistic one. 
It explains how the agents in these puzzles reason about the situations they 
find themselves in. A slight blemish of this approach is that, it is informal. For 
example, the solution of the puzzle where the native Pi states that he and his 
wife, P2, are both knaves is given as follows [42, p. 16]:
If the husband were a knight, he would never have claimed that he 
and his wife were both knaves. Therefore he must be a knave. Since 
he is a knave, his statement is false; so they are not both knaves.
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This means his wife must be kniglit. Therefore he is a knave and 
she is a knight.
This informal solution seems to be the right way to handle these puzzles. What 
we will try to do in the sequel is in some sense to formalize this using situation- 
theoretic concepts.
5.3 The Situated Approach
Situation theory, as mentioned earlier, is tailor-made for the problems involving 
knowledge and information. It provides a group of features that motivated 
the design of the language PROSIT which is especially suitable for writing 
commonsense reasoning programs.
One of these features is that “situations are first-class citizens of the the­
ory.” This feature combines reasoning in situations and about situations. More 
specifically, situations can be arguments to relations. Therefore situation the­
ory should not only be considered as a theory of relations in situations, but 
also of relations among situations.
Both individual and common knowledge are represented as situations. These 
situations consist of a number of infons representing the facts an agent is aware 
of. So if Jack knows that John has the ace of spades and that Mary has the 
queen of spades, then the situation representing Jack’s individual knowledge, 
i.e., jack-knows, will consist of two infons (discarding any unrelated stuff):
(!= jack-knows (has John ace_of.spades))
(!= jack-knows (has тагу queen_of.spades))
This representation is analogous to the definition of the the agents’ knowledge 
in epistemic puzzles. For example. Max’s knowledge of the facts /a cti, /ac<2 , 
and facts, i.e., =  { f  acti, fa ct2, facts), is represented as (!=  maxJcnows
(in fon _l) (infonJ2) (in fon .3 )) where maxJcnows stands for the individual 
knowledge of Max and in f on.i for the the infon stating fact{.
.An important advantage of using situations to represent knowledge is that
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it is possible to express some statements that are not expressible in logic. For 
example, the statement
“I know a man who drinks wine every night.”
can be most closely rendered in predicate logic by the following expression:
(3x)[know{I, x) A drinks-wine(x)]
However, this expression can also be interpreted as: “I know a man, and that 
man drinks wine evei’y night. (I don’t know whether he di’inks wine every 
night.)”  ^ Using situations to represent knowledge we would use the following 
infons to express the statement.
(!= i_know (man *x))
(!= i Jmow (drinks_wine *x))
On the other hand, if I didn’t know whether he drinks wine every night, then 
the second infon would not hold. (It would hold in that agent’s individual 
knowledge who is aware of that fact.)
Another feature of situation theory that helps formalize epistemic concepts 
is the general treatment of partial information. As mentioned previously, situ­
ations are partial, i.e., they do not define the truth or falsity of all relations on 
all objects in the domain. Assume that there are two agents, Mary and John, 
facing each other stand in a room, and there is a cat behind Mary. As John 
is seeing the cat, the situation that models his knowledge will support the fact 
that there is a cat in the room:
(!= johnJcnows (in_room cat))
However, in the situation representing Mary’s knowledge there should not be 
an infon about the cat being in the room. When a query is made about the
^This is very similar to the argument Barwise advances about representing perception [4,
p. 21].
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cat in the situation representing Mary’s knowledge, the answer should not be 
“no” but rather “unknown” .
Additionally deductive omniscience and circularity of knowledge are han­
dled elegantly. Logical omniscience is supported by the feature of “informa­
tional constraints” in situation theory. Constraints are the main tool for in­
formation flow. They are relations that hold between two situation-types, 
therefore are also considered as infons. For example, if Jack is aware of (or at­
tuned to) the constraint that everything that smiles is happy, and knows that 
John is smiling, then he deduces the fact that John is happy. The constraint 
is represented as follows:
(resp jackJcnows (=> (smiles *X) (happy *X)))
The circularity of knowledge is modeled via “self-referential expx-essions” 
which is another important feature of situation theory. Situations are members 
par excellence of the ontology of situation theory; therefore, they can be used as 
constituents of infons. This property makes it possible to define circularity. For 
example, if common stands for the situation holding the facts that are common 
to every agent, i.e., the common knowledge situation, and jackJtnows stands 
for Jack’s individual knowledge, then the following expressions state that Jack 
knows everything that is common knowledge:
(!= jack-knows common) or 
([_ common jackJinows)
In PROSIT the second representation expresses the subchunk relation. It can 
be translated as “common is totally described by the infons in jackJcnows.” So 
if (in fon ) holds in common, then (!=  common (in fo n ))  holds in jackJcnows.
Using the subchunk relation it is straightforward to define circularity. ( [_ 
jackJcnows jack-Jcnows) will generate a self-referential situation, and as j a ­
ckJcnows stands for the individual knowledge of Jack, it will provide the cir­
cularity of Jack’s individual knowledge. So if Jack knows that Mary has the 
queen of spades, then all of the following infons will hold:
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(!= jack_knows (has mary queen-of-spades))
(!= jackJcnows (!= jack_knows (has mary queen-of-spades)))
(!= jackJcnows (!= jackJcnows (!= jackJcnows (has mary queen-of-spades))))
Jack knows that he knows that Mary has the queen of spades, he knows that 
he knows that he knows that Mary has the queen of spades, and so on.
The final feature of situation theory that led us to using it as a framework for 
epistemic puzzles is the “situatedness of information and constraints” [33, 43].
Each infon or constraint exists in a situation (more formally, is supported 
by a situation). Consequently, each infon or constraint has an interpretation 
according to the situation it exists in. This can be considered as “context 
dependence” [1 ].
To clarify the argument above, consider a constraint that deduces facts 
about the height of individuals. Let both Mike and John be 185 cm tall. Both 
are aware of the fact that if someone is higher than 185 cm, then that individual 
is taller than Mike and John. The following represents the constraint that is 
supported by Mike’s (or John’s) knowledge:
(resp mikeJcnows (<= (taller *y *x)
(me *x)
(height *y *h)
(> *h 185)))
If John knows that Bob is 175 cm tall and Mike knows that Bill is 195 cm tall, 
then Mike will deduce the fact that Bill is taller than himself, viz.
(!= mikeJcnows (taller bill mike))
but John will not be able to deduce anything using the previous constraint.
The same argument holds for infons. Assume a case which Holmes and 
Watson are working on. Consider a theft in which the door of the flat that the 
thief broke into is not fractured and that the windows are closed. Although
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both Holmes and Watson cue aware of these facts, only Holmes is able to deduce 
the fact that the thief had the key to the door:
(!= holmes-knows (no (broken door)) (closed windows))
(!= watsonJmows (no (broken door)) (closed windows))
This is because only Holmes finds out that the thief has a key, using the 
following constraint:
(resp holmesJcnows (=> (and (no (broken door))
(closed windows)
(has thief key))))
This example demonstrates that the same infon can generate different facts 
in different contexts; a system should simulate this capability if it is trying to 
perform human-like reasoning.
From the argument above, it can be concluded that the main advantage of 
using situation theory in representing knowledge is the conceptual clarity and 
elegance it offers. Epistemic puzzles can be modeled without much effort. All 
the tools required for such a modeling are already present in the domain of 
situation theory. This, as mentioned numerous times throughout this thesis, is 
due to the fact that situation theory is a natural theory of information.
5.3.1 The Three Wisemen Problem
The solution of the “Three Wisemen Problem” [31] in PROSIT is, to our 
best knowledge, the only serious attempt to use situation-theoretic constructs 
in the resolution of epistemic puzzles. The main aim is to show how to use 
common knowledge computationally in solving problems involving cooperation 
of multiple agents. It turns out that the situation-theoretic aspects of PROSIT 
(reasoning about situations and in situations) generate an intuitive and simple 
solution for this hypothetical problem [31, p. 79]:
Three wisemen are sitting at a table, facing each other, each with
a white hat on his head. Someone tells them that each of them has
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Inheritance relation 
Ownership relation
P'igure 5.1. The Three Wisemen Problem. The facts known to all wisemen are 
kept in situation W. The facts that A knows are kept in situation A. The facts 
that A knows that C knows are kept in situation A.C. The facts that A knows 
that C knows that B knows are kept in situation A.C.B.
a white or red hat but that there is at least one white hat. Each 
wiseman can see the others’ hats but not his own. If a fourth person 
asks them whether they know their own color, then the first two 
wisemen will answer no, but, after that, the third one will answer 
yes.
The available facts in the problem can be categorized into two groups: facts 
that all wisemen are aware of, and facts that are known individually. Facts 
such as that there are three agents A, B, and C, that all agents are wise, and 
that each agent is wearing either a white or a red hat are known by all three 
wisemen. On the other hand, the fact that say, B and C  are wearing white 
hats is known only by A.
There are two ways for an agent to decide that his hat is white. The first is 
when the other two wisemen have red hats. The second is when his assumption 
of having a red hat causes a contradiction. The approach followed by [31] is to 
use the latter in order to solve this problem. A assumes that he has a red hat. 
After B and C  answers no, A concludes that C should have said yes (because 
from B’s answer C concludes that at least one of A and C is wearing a white 
hat) if he were wearing a red hat. So he knows that he is wearing a white hat. 
PROSIT’s tree hierarchy of situations makes it rather easy to represent this 
(Figure 5.1).
The program that models this puzzle has a deficiency. It is not possible to 
distinguish the following two cases that would result in different ways:
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• The logicians answering the questions in sequence.
• The logicians answering all at the same time (in which case none of them 
can decide on their color).
5.3.2 Smullyan’s Puzzles
These puzzles are epistemic in the sense that knights ‘reflect’ their individual 
knowledge and beliefs while knaves ‘reflect’ the contrary of them. A simple 
puzzle of this type is the following [42, pp. 15-16):
The census-taker Mr. McGregor once did some fieldwork on the 
Island of Knights and Knaves. On this island, women are also called 
knights and knaves. McGregor decided on this visit to interview 
married couples only. McGregor knocked on one door; the husband 
partly opened it and asked McGregor his business. “I am a census- 
taker,” replied McGregor, “and I need information about you and 
your wife. Which, if either, is a knight, and which, if either, is a 
knave?”
“We are both knaves!” said the husband angrily as he slammed the 
door. What type is the husband and what type is the wife?
The solution is as follows [42, p. 16):
If the husband were a knight, he would never have claimed that he 
and his wife were both knaves. Therefore he must be a knave. Since 
he is a knave, his statement is false; so they are not both knaves.
This means his wife must be knight. Therefore he is a knave and 
she is a knight.
As it can be seen from the solution of the puzzle, when a reasoner is asked to 
solve this puzzle he first makes assumptions. Then based on these assumptions 
he considers a hypothetical world and tries to find out if there are any inco­
herencies in this hypothetical world. If an incoherency exists he concludes that 
his assumption is wrong and totally forgets about that hypothetical world.
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vSecond Assumptions
Sitl X Sit2 X Sit3 X Sit4 y
Figure 5 .2 . The hypothetical worlds created by the reasoner for the cen­
sus-taker problem. There is only one world (Sit4) coherent with the statement 
the husband uttered.
The reasoner continues to make new assumptions (while learning something 
from the previous failures) until he finds all the solutions of the puzzle, i.e., 
the coherent hypothetical worlds (Figure 5.2). In the puzzle above, first it 
was assumed that the husband is a knight, but this a.' sumption led to failure 
because a knight can never claim that he is a knave i^ an incoherency). So it 
was decided that the husband is a knave.
Examining the structure of these puzzles one will n otice properties that are 
suitable for a situation-theoretic representation:
• Actions always take place in a clearly defined context, i.e., the Island of 
Knights and Knaves.
• There are abstract individuals, properties, and relations (e.g., being a 
knight, being on the island, and so on).
• There are well-defined rules that invariably hold on the island (e.g., 
knights always make true statements).
As mentioned previously, a system to solve these puzzles should be able to make 
human-like reasoning. There are three main properties that enable PROSIT 
to simulate human-like reasoning. The first one is situated programming, i.e..
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infons and consti'ciints are local to situations. The second is PROSIT’s situation 
tree structure, with which one can represent nested knowledge/belief (e.g., “y4 
thinks that D believes that C knows The third is the use of incoherency
to generate new information. Now, it is time to see how PROSIT solves these 
puzzles. The following puzzle [42, pp. 23-24] will be exploited to explain our 
approach:
This is the story of a philosopher—a logician, in fact— who visited 
the cluster of islands and fell in love with a bird-girl named Oona.
They were married. His marriage was a happy one, except that 
his wife was too flighty! For example, he would come home late at 
night for dinner, but if it was a particularly lovely evening, Oona 
would have flown off to another island. So he would have to paddle 
around in his canoe from one island to another until he found Oona 
and brought her home. [... ] On one occasion, the husband came 
to an island in search of Oona and met two natives A and B. He 
asked them whether Oona had landed on the island. He got the 
following responses:
A\ J5 is a knight, and Oona is on this island.
B: is a knave, and Oona is on this island.
Is Oona on this island?
The solution of this puzzle will make use of various properties of PROSIT, 
including inheritance. As the solution is based on creating hypothetical situ­
ations and testing their coherency, it is useful to have a situation, say island, 
from which all the hypothetical situations will inherit some essential facts that 
will not change from one situation to another. For example, the fact that the 
native A says is a knight, and Oona is on this island” will hold in every 
hypothetical situation. Therefore this fact is kept in island. Similarly, the rules 
stating that knights always make true statements and that knaves always make 
false statements are kept in island. The three main constraints used in the so­
lution of this puzzle are shown in Figure 5.3. The first step of the .solution, i.e., 
making assumptions about the natives, is simulated by creating hypothetical 
situations. Each hypothetical situation represents a different combination of 
assumptions. A reasoner can assume the native A to be a knight or a knave, 
the native B to be a knight or a knave, and Oona to be on the island or not.
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; testing the coherency of a situation requires a 
; translation of the uttered sentences to what they 
; really mean
(! (resp island (<= (coherent)
(means PI *sentence ^translation)
(means P2 *sentence2 *translation2)
(and ^translation *translation2))))
; every sentence uttered by a knight is true 
(! (resp island (<= (means *x »sentence »sentence)
(says »X »sentence)
(knight »x))))
; any sentence uttered by a knave is false 
(! (resp island (<= (means »x »sentence (no »sentence)) 
(says »X »sentence)
(knave »x))))
Figure 5.3. Three main constraints of the puzzle about Oona.
So, the program will generate eight (2 )^ hypothetical situations. The follow­
ing are two hypothetical situations (Sitl, Sit2) that we will be examining 
throughout this section:
Sitl: (knight A) (knave B) (on_island Oona)
Sit2: (knave A) (knave B) (not_on_island Oona)
The next step is to generate the infons that hold in the hypothetical situations. 
If a knight makes a statement, it means that this statement holds in that 
situation. On the other hand, if a statement is made by a knave, it is concluded 
that the negation of that statement holds in the situation. So the following 
infons hold in the hypothetical situations Sitl and Sit2:
Sitl: (and (knight B) (on_island Oona))
(no (and (knave A) (on_island Oona)))
Sit2: (no (and (knight B) (on_island Oona))
(no (and (knave A) (on_island Oona)))
The final step is to check the hypothetical situations and to discard the ones 
that are incoherent. The coherent situations are then the solutions of the puz­
zle. In the previous case Sitl is one of the incoherent hypothetical situations 
to be discarded, and Sit2 is a solution (in fact, the only solution):
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Sitl: (and (knight B) (on_island Oona)) (from the second step) 
(knave B) (from the first step)
Incoherency!
S it 2 : Coherent, therefore A and B are knaves and Oona is not on 
the island.
Smullyan’s solution is as follows [42, p. 26]:
A couldn’t possibly be knight, for if he were, then B would be 
a knight (as A said), which would make A a knave (as B said). 
Therefoi'e A is definitely a knave. If Oona is on the island we get 
the following contradiction: It is then true that /4 is a knave and 
Oona is on the island, hence B made a true statement, which makes 
B a knight. But then A made a true statement in claiming that B 
is a knight and Oona is on the island, contrary to the fact that A 
is a knave! The only way out of the contradiction is that Oona is 
not on the island. So Oona is not on this island (and, of course, A 
and B are both knaves).
The simpler puzzle given earlier, i.e., the one about Mr. McGregor, is solved 
in a similar fashion. There are two natives, //an d  IT, in the puzzle. Each can 
be either a knight or a knave. So there wilt be four hypothetical situations 
(Figure 5 .2 ):
Sitl: (knight H) (knight W)
Sit2: (knight H) (knave W)
Sit3: (knave H) (knight W)
Sit4: (knave H) (knave W)
After the generation of new infons using the statement uttered by //, the hy­
pothetical situations will consist of the following:
Sitl: (knight H) (knight W) (emd (knave H) (knave W))
Sit2: (knight H) (knave W) (and (knave H) (knave W))
Sit3: (knave H) (knight W) (no (and (knave H) (knave W))) 
Sit4: (knave H) (knave H) (no (and (knave H) (knave W)))
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; if a native is a knight, he definitely is not a knave 
(! (resp island (=> (knight *x)
(no (knave *x)))))
; if a native is a knave, he definitely is not a knight 
(! (resp island (=> (knave *x)
(no (knight *x)))))
; (no (and *stl *st2)) is equivalent to 
; (or (no *stl) (no *st2))
(! (resp island (<= (means *x (or (no *stl) (no *st2))) 
(says *x (and *stl *st2))
(knave *x))))
; (no (or *stl *st2)) is equivalent to 
; (and (no *stl) (no *st2))
(! (resp island (<= (means *x (and (no *stl) (no *st2))) 
(says *x (or *stl *st2))
(knave *x))))
Figure 5.4. The constraints about negative knowledge.
Among these hypothetical situations the only coherent one is S it3 , which states 
that II is a knave and IT is a knight.
It is time to examine how PROSIT finds out about these incoherencies. 
As it is seen from the examples above a distinguishing feature of PROSIT 
is that it allows incoherency in situations. A situation may support both i 
and (no i) . This should not be considered as a contradiction in the system, 
but merely a contradiction in the situation, which means that the situation 
is incoherent (cannot be actual). This kind of incoherency can be adequately 
used to get new information. In the example above, there is a situation (S it l)  
that supports both (knight H) and (knave H). (knave H) is equivalent to 
(no (knight H)) (using the rules in Figure 5.4), therefore both (knight H) 
and its negation are supported by the situation. The situation is incoherent and 
the assumptions have failed. One final comment on PROSIT is that it does not 
apply the predicate no over the predicates and and or, therefore two additional 
constraints should be explicitly defined in order to achieve this (Figure 5.4).
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5.3.3 The Cheating Husbands Puzzle
The cheating husbands puzzle, studied in Section 5 .2 , is well-known from folk­
lore [19] and has long been the primary example to illustrate the subtle rela­
tionship between knowledge, communication, and action in a distributed en­
vironment [16]. The puzzle involves an initial step in which a set of facts is 
announced publicly, thereby becoming common knowledge.
Moses et al. [30], using a number of variants of the puzzle, try to describe 
what happens when
1 . synchronous communication,
2 . asynchronous communication, and
3. ring-based communication
channels are used to communicate the protocol to be followed, i.e., announce 
the orders of the queen. The distributed computational point of view is mainly 
interested in the types of protocols, the delays and bounds in communication, 
and whether the communication is fault-tolerant or not. For example, instead 
of making an announcement at the town-square, the queen sends letters to 
all wives which makes the communication asynchronous. Similarly, to test 
whether the system is fault-tolerant, another version of the puzzle in which 
wives are disobedient, i.e., wives that talk to each other about their husbands, 
is used.
On the other hand, we are interested in the way agents reason about knowl­
edge, assuming that communication is totally synchronous and reliable. We 
are using the puzzle to illustrate how intelligent agents rea.son in a multi-agent 
system, and how they represent each others’ knowledge.
The tree wisernen problem is a special case of this puzzle where the number 
of agents is restricted to three. In this puzzle all the wives in Marnajorca know 
each other. They know that a husband is either faithful or unfaithful. On the 
other hand, none of the wives know whether their husbands are faithful or not. 
Because all of these facts are common to all the wives in Mamajorca, they 
are supported by the situation wives which holds the infons that are common
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to all individuals in the puzzle. Some of the relations require an argument 
that indicates the temporal location. The temporal location is represented 
by an integer, n, which indicates the 7?th night after the queen has made the 
announcement. Every silent night after the announcement is regarded as the 
wives not being able to decide about their husbands fidelity. In modeling this 
puzzle, we are only interested in what the the wives in Mamajorca know about 
the fidelity of the husbands in Mamajorca.
We now analyze the case where there are three unfaithful husbands. After 
the second silent night following the announcement the queen made, b ’s (a 
wife) not knowing whether her husband is faithful or unfaithful is represented 
as
(!=  wives (no (!=  b ( fa it h fu l  b 2 ) ) ) )
( !=  wives (no (!=  b (u n fa ith fu l b 2 ) ) ) )
Let a be one of the wives whose husband is unfaithful. Throughout the two 
silent nights she knows who the other cheated wives are (say, b and c).
a (u n fa ith fu l b 1 ) )  
a (u n fa ith fu l c l ) )  
a (u n fa ith fu l b 2 ) )  
a (u n fa ith fu l c 2 ) )
A wife whose husband is unfaithful, would realize this fact either if none of 
the other wives are cheated (because the queen declared that there are some 
unfaithful husbands) or if her assumption that her husband is faithful generates 
a contradiction. The latter can be considered as proof-by-contradiction.
The way a wife decides that her husband is unfaithful is via making as­
sumptions and checking whether an assumption causes any incoherencies (Fig­
ure 5.5). Let a be the wife who is reasoning. In the constraint that models 
the way a wife would reason in such a situation, the premise (me *x) would 
bind *x to the situation this constraint is activated in, e.g., a. The next two 
premises bind the variables *y and *z to the other cheated wives b and c. The 
premises
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( ! ( [_ wives * y ))
(! ( 0 < wives *y ))
indicate that b, i.e., the individual bound to the variable *y, knows that the 
facts supported by wives are common to all wives (subchunck relation), and 
is aware of all the facts that are supported by wives (subtype relation). Next 
a assumes that her husband is faithful. She knows that if her husband were 
faithful, the other wives would know it. In the program, this assumption is 
made by asserting the fact that a ’s husband is faithful in the situation that 
holds the facts that a knows that b knows, via the premise
(j ( !=  !»cy ( fa ith fu l  *x * p re )))
The variable *pre is assigned to the value *tim e—1 (using the b in d -lisp  
predicate that makes use of Lisp functions), where *time indicates the night 
on which the reasoning is made. Moreover, the facts that a knows about c ’s 
husband are also asserted into the situation supporting the facts that a knows 
that b knows, because what a knows about c ’s husband, b knows it too. This is 
achieved by the constraint transfer_knowledge_about_third. The final step 
is to check if the assumption a made would cause any incoherency. This is 
realized by the constraint incoherent which checks if a situation supports a 
fact we know it does not support. It should be noted that this rule implicitly 
expresses the fact that if someone is not faithful, he is unfaithful.
The constraint that transfers knowledge about the third individual (Figure 
5.6) is a good example of the use of the situation tree hierarchy. If a knows 
on the second night after the announcement was made that b ’s husband is 
unfaithful
(!=  a (u n fa ith fu l b 2 ) )  
then she knows that c knows it too
(!=  a (!=  c (u n fa ith fu l b 2 ) ) )
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; A w ife  knows that her husband is  un fa ith fu l i f  the 
; assumption that her husband is  fa ith fu l resu lts  in 
; an incoherent s itu a tion .
( ! (resp wives (<= (u n fa ith fu l *x *time)
(me *x)
(w ife  *y)
(w ife  *z)
(not (= *x *y ))
(not (= *z *x ))
(not (= *z *y ))
( ! ( [_ wives * y ))
(! (@< wives *y ))
(b in d -lisp  *pre ( -  *time 1 ) )
(! (!=  *y ( fa ith fu l  *x *p re )))
(transferJcnow ledge^bout-third *y *z)
(incoherent * y ) ) ) )
Figure 5.5. The constraint that decides the fidelity of a husband by making 
assumptions and searching for incoherencies.
So an infon supported by the situation a is copied to another situation a .c  
using the procedure transfer_knowledge_about_third .
The constraint incoherent (Figure 5.6) checks whether a situation is co­
herent or not. This is achieved by searching for an infon that is supported by 
that situation with both positive and negative polarities.
To clarify the explanations made above, consider how a would reason until 
she finds out that her husband is unfaithful, a knows that b and c are being 
cheated:
(!=  a (u n fa ith fu l b 3 )) 
(!=  a (u n fa ith fu l c 3 ))
a wishes to learn whether her husband is faithful or not. She assumes that her 
husband is faithful. She knows that if her assumption were true, then b would
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; A hypoth etica l s itu ation  is  incoherent i f  i t  
; supports a fa c t  we know i t  does not su pport.
(! (resp wives (<= (incoherent *y)
(no (!=  *y *x ))
( ! =  *y * x ) ) ) )
; I f  the wives *x and *y know the character o f the 
; th ird  w ife 's  (*z) husband, they know that each o f them 
; knows i t .  So i f  (!=  *x (character * z ) ) ,  then 
; ( !=  *x (!=  *y (character * z ) ) )  should be asserted .
(! (resp wives (<= (tran sf er_knowledge^bout_third *y *z)  
(or 
(and
(character *character)
(^character *z *time)
(b in d -lisp  *pre ( -  *time 1 ))
(! (!=  *y (*character *z * p r e ) ) )
)
( t r u e ) ) ) ) )
Figure 5.6. Constraints that are used to find incoherencies and to transfer 
knowledge about the third party.
be aware of this fact. She also knows that b knows the fact that c is being 
cheated.
(!=  a (!=  b ( fa ith fu l  a 2))) ; a 's  assumption
(!=  a (!=  b (u n fa ith fu l c 2))) ; tran sferred  knowledge about c
b did not shoot her husband on the second night, i.e., she did not know that 
her husband was unfaithful. So, an incoherency would occur, if she shot her 
husband on the second night, i.e., if she knew that her husband was unfaithful. 
(This would make a’s assumption false, and mean that a’s husband is unfaith­
ful.) To decide on the truth of her assumption, a should learn whether b could 
have decided that her husband is faithful or unfaithful, b could decide about 
her husbands fidelity, just like a did. b would also assume that her husband 
was faithful. Then b would know that c would also know this fact on the first 
night after the announcement was made, b would also know that c would have 
known that a’s husband is faithful.
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( !=  a (!=  b (!=  c ( fa it h fu l  b 1 ) ) ) )  ; b ’ s assumption
(!=  a (!=  b (!=  c ( fa ith fu l  a 1 ) ) ) )  ; tran sferred  knowledge about a
However this assumption of b would lead to a contradiction, because if c had 
known that both a’s and b ’s husbands are faithful, then she would have imme­
diately decided that her husband is unfaithful and shoot him.
Because of this incoherency, b must decide that her husband is unfaithful, 
on the second night, and shoot him. In other words, if a’s assumption about 
her husband were true then b would have shot her husband on the second night. 
But this did not happen, which means that a's assumption that her husband 
is faithful fails, a’s husband is unfaithful and she shoots her husband on the 
third night after the announcement was made. Making the same reasoning b 
and c also shoot their husbands.
5.3.4 The Facing Logicians Puzzle
The facing logicians puzzle is another famous puzzle which can be considered 
to be epistemic. The puzzle statement was given in Section 5.1. Assume that 
the first logician. A, has the number 4 on the card on his forehead, and the 
other logician, B, has the number 3.
A knows that the number on the forehead of B is 3, while the B knows 
that A has the number 4 on his forehead. It is common knowledge to both of 
the logicians that the numbers on their foreheads are positive. (Both of the 
logicians are aware of the fact that common knowledge is common.)
(!=  a (num b 3 ))
(!=  b (num a 4 ))
(!=  common (no (num a 0 ) ) )  
(!=  common (no (num b 0 ) ) )  
( [_ common a)
(@< common a)
( [_ common b)
(Q< common b)
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; if the number on the other logician’s forehead is n and 
; if the logician knows that the number on his forehead 
; is not n-1, then the number on his forehead is n+1 
(! (resp common (<= (know *x)
(me *x)
(logician *y)
(not (= *x *y))
(num *y *z)
(bind-lisp *a (- * z 1))
(no (num *x *a))
(bind-lisp *k (+ * z 1))
(! (num *x *k)))))
Figure 5.7. The constraint with which a logician finds out the number on his 
forehead.
Facts that are common knowledge are known by all the individuals and it is 
known that these facts are common (Figure 5.7). The subchunk relation, [_, 
is used to indicate that the individual knows that the facts supported by the 
situation common are common. The subtype relation, <3<, on the other, indicates 
that any infon that is supported by the situation common is also supported by 
the situation representing the individual’s knowledge.
It is also common knowledge that the numbers are consecutive. So if a 
logician knows that the number on the forehead of the other logician is n and 
if he also knows that the number on his own forehead is not n — 1 then he 
definitely knows that the number on his forehead is n + 1 .
Assume that B is the one who is asked if he knows what the number on his 
forehead is. B would answer “no” because he does not have enough knowledge 
to make a decision. He could only answer “yes” if the number on the forehead 
of A were 1 . Then he could easily deduce the fact that the number on his 
forehead was 2. B's answer, however, will make A to learn that the number on 
his (A ’s) forehead is not 1 .
How does A come to such a decision? Well, he makes assumptions about 
the number on his forehead. He assumes that the number on his forehead is 
1 . If, it were so, then B would know it. In the program this fact is asserted 
to the situation B.A which holds the facts that A knows that B knows. A 
continues reasoning: “ If B knew that the number on my forehead were 1 , would
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(! (resp common (<= (no (know *x))
(me *x)
(logician +y)
(not (= *x *y))
(not (!= common (num *y *k)))
(no (num *y *z))
(bind-lisp *a (+ * z 1))
(! (!= *y (num *x *a)))
(! ( [_ common *y))
(! (Q< common *y))
(incoherent *y)
(clear *y)
(not (num *x *s))
(! (!= common (no (num *x *a)))))))
Figure 5.8. The constraint that generates the numbers that cannot be on the 
forehead of a logician.
everything be as it is now? Would it cause any contradiction?” So A tries to 
find a contradiction in the facts that he knows that B knows. From his previous 
answer A knows that B does not know what the number on his (5 ’s) forehead 
is. So A tries to prove that B would know the number on his (B's) forehead, 
if the number on /I ’s forehead were 1, and reach to a contradiction. B would 
know what the number on his (.B’s)forehead is using the rule mentioned in the 
previous paragraph (Figure 5.7). This kind of reasoning using incoherencies in 
situations is performed by the constraint in Figure 5.8.
To elucidate the way the program deduces the facts about the number on 
the forehead of a logician, we examine in detail the situation in which a has 4 
on his forehead, and b has 3. In the beginning, it is common knowledge that 
none of the logicians have the number 0  on their foreheads:
(!= common (no (num a 0)))
(!= common (no (num b 0)))
The situation tree is illustrated in Figure 5.9 where a and b are the situations 
that support the facts known by A and B, and common denotes the situation 
supporting the facts that are common to both agents. The dashed arrows 
indicate that both a and b are inheriting the infons supported by common, i.e., 
both agents are aware of the facts that are common, and know that these facts
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top
Figure 5.9. The situation tree shows the facts that A knows, B knows, and 
those that are common.
top
Figure 5.10. A makes the assumption that the number on his forehead is 1 , 
and reaches to an incoherency.
are common.
After B says “I don’t know my number,” the fact that the number on A’s 
forehead is not 0, turns out to be common knowledge (Figure 5.10):
(!= common (no (num a 1)))
Next, A says “I don’t know my number,” which means that the number on 
B's forehead is neither 1 nor 2 (Figure 5.11):
(!= common (no (num b 1)))
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top
F'igure 5.11. B makes the assumption that the number on his forehead is 1 or 
2 , and each time is led to an incoherency.
top
Figure 5 .1 2 . A finds out that the number on his forehead is neither 2 nor 3.
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(op
Figure 5.13. A knows that the number on his forehead is 4 .
(!= common (no (num b 2)))
Then, B once again says “I don’t know my number,” and it is concluded that 
the number on y4’s forehead is neither 2 nor 3 (Figure 5 .1 2 ) ;
(!= common (no (num a 2)))
(!= common (no (num a 3)))
At this moment, A deduces the fact that the number on his forehead is 4, 
because he knows the facts that the numbers are consecutive, that 5 ’s number 
is 3, and that the number on his own forehead is not 2  (Figure 5.13):
(!= a (num a 4))
Note that the logicians are making intelligent assumptions. If it is known 
that the number on the forehead of A is not n, then B assumes that the number 
on his forehead is n + 1 . At the instant when it is known that the number on 
the forehead of A is not 0 and 1 , B assumes that the number on his forehead is 
1 or 2, which helps him reach an incoherency, and derive new facts. However, 
B's assuming that the number on his forehead is, say 8 , would not help him 
much.
Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
This thesis should be considered as a field test on computational systems based 
on situation theory [5, 8 , 14, 15, 36, 52, 53]. Our primary aim was to analyze a 
language (PROSIT [31, 32, 35]) which isbased on situation theory and investi­
gate applications that can grow upon the tools situation theory provides. We 
chose epistemic puzzles [38, 39, 40, 42, 34, 19] as the test domain, because these 
puzzles mainly study the knowledge individuals are aware of and the way they 
reason about it. We believe that situation theory provides an ontologically 
adequate framework to represent such puzzles.
Our results show that situation theoretic languages [31, 32, 35, 44, 48, 46, 
50, 9, 10] are suitable means for human-like reasoning. PROSIT is especially 
appropriate for problems involving knowledge and belief. PROSIT provides 
some of the situation theoretic concepts such as self-referential expressions, 
and situations as arguments of infons. Moreover, it offers additional tools such 
as the situation tree hierarchy and the inheritance mechanism, which make it 
easier to represent individual and common knowledge.
This thesis should be considered as an initial study on ‘real life’ situation- 
theoretic applications. We hope that this study will provide the necessary 
motivation for further investigation on the computational systems based on 
situation theory cind their deployment to model assorted problems of knowl­
edge representation. A logical next step in this regard will be to exercise the 
capabilities of BABY-SIT [44, 48, 46].
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Appendix A
System Predicates in PROSIT
Here, we give a brief definition of some of the system predicates in PROSIT. 
All of these are called by querying which can be done either at the top level 
(top) or within a situation. Some s}'stem predicates may also be called by 
asserting them, but this is only useful if the predicate has some side-effect, like 
printing something or asserting something into a situation.
The following describes the effects and results of the system predicates when 
queried in a situation s that is the interpreter’s current focus of attention, also 
called the “current situation.”
A .l  Predicates for traversing the situation tree
( !=  sit infon)
Asserting ( != sit infon) goes into sit (as described in the current situation 
s) and asserts infon there. Asserting (!=  sit infon) causes the query (!=  sit 
infon) to succeed thereafter (unless later retracted). (!=  sit infon) expres­
sions are not just system queries, but also infons that can be supported by 
situations.
(IN sit)
Focuses the interpreter on sit, as described in the current situation s.
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Pushes s onto a stack of situations. Remains in effect until an (OUT) or until 
the user-input loop is ex ited .
(OUT)
Focuses the interpreter’s attention onto the topmost situation on the stack 
formed by previous (IN si'O ’s. The interpreter thus returns to the situation 
that we were focused on before the IN that brought us here.
A ,2 Database control predicates
( ! inf on 1 ... infonk)
When either asserted or queried, asserts infonl . . .  infonk (which could be 
a system predicate like !=, <-, resp, rule, or [_) in the current situation s. 
This may trigger the application of forward-chaining rules.
Each infon is always queried before being asserted (note that backward 
chaining rules may be used), and the assertion will not take place if the query 
succeeds.
(-! fo r m )
Removes from the current situation s all infons infon matching form  that 
have been explicitly asserted to be supported in s. Implicitly, infon will also 
be removed from the supersituations of s, and (!=  s infon) will be removed 
from any superchunks of s and from the situation describing s.
A.3 Constraints
(<= head goall goaln)
This is the form for backward-chaining constraints suitable as an argument 
to RESP or RULE. However, if a <= infon is asserted in a situation, it automat­
ically becomes respected by that situation. So, in the current version there is 
no difference between asserting (RULE (<= . . .  ) )  and (<= . . .  ).
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(RESP sit constr)
When asserted, causes sit, as described in the current situation s, to respect 
the constraint constr, which may be either a backward-chaining constraint (see 
above) or a forward-chaining constraint (see below).
(=> head result 1 . . .  resultn)
This is the form for forward-chaining constraints suitable as an argument to 
RESP or RULE. However, if a => infon is asserted in a situation, it automatically 
becomes respected by that situation. So, in the current version there is no 
difference between asserting (RULE (=> .. .  ) )  and (=> . . .  ).
(RULE constr)
When asserted, causes the current situation s to respect the constraint con­
str, which may be either a backward-chaining or a forward-chaining constraint. 
(See above.)
When queried, succeeds if s has been asserted to respect constr.
A .4 Control predicates, logical connectives
(AND infonl ... infonk)
Identical to ( ! infonl ... infonk) when asserted.
When queried, succeeds if and only if all of infonl . . .  infonk succeed when 
queried, in order. If any one fails, or if the entire AND is backtracked to, we 
backtrack through the infoni's until we find another solution or there are no 
more.
(OR infonl ... infonk)
Succeeds if any of in fo n l... infonk succeed when queried. First tries infonl·, 
if it fails, or if the entire OR is backtracked to and there are no more solutions 
to infonl, goes on to infon2, and so on.
APPENDIX A. SYSTEM PREDICATES IN PROSIT 64
(NOT goal)
Succeeds if and only if the given goal cannot be proven. Not the same as 
(NO goal), which asks if we can prove the opposite of goal.
(CUT)
Succeeds. But if it is backtracked to, it not only fails but prevents further 
backtracking, causing the higher-level goal (of which it is a part) to fail.
(FAIL)
Never succeeds.
(TRUE)
Always succeeds.
A .5 Relations between situations
(Q< sitl sit2)
When asserted, causes the current situation s to describe that supports 
i for every infon i valid in sitl and that sit2 respects every constraint that is 
respected by sitl, i.e. sitl becomes a subtype of sit2.
(< - sitl SÜ2)
The same as (@< sitl sit2) except that only infons, but no constraints are 
inherited.
( [- sitl sit2)
When asserted, causes sitl to be a subchunk of sit2. This means that sitl 
is totally described by the infons in sit2. If (!=  sitl infon) holds in stt2, then 
infon holds in sitl. And vice versa if infon holds in sitl then (!=  sitl infon) 
holds in sit2.
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A .6 Unification
(= expi'l expr2)
Tries to P-unify txprl and expr2. This is used both to assign a param­
eter to another expression (number, string, list) and to bind two unassigned 
parameters together so that they can be used interchangeably.
A .7 Using Lisp within PROSIT
(LISP expr)
Substitutes the variables in expression expr with their bindings. If the 
result is a valid Lisp function call, then calls on Lisp to evaluate it. Succeeds 
if the Lisp call returns non-nil. If a variable is unbound it is used as is.
(BIND-LISP var expression)
If var is a free variable, evaluates expression as a Lisp function (as in the 
l i s p  predicate above) and binds var to the value returned by the function.
A .8 Interacting with PROSIT
(RUN)
Starts PROSIT from Lisp. May be queried within PROSIT to create a 
nested, clean, empty sub-session. (Does not free stack space.)
(LOAD filename)
If filename is a string naming an existing file, reads PROSIT expressions 
in from the file as if the user typed them, but does not print any output. .Just 
as in user input, the file may contain ? ’s and ! ’s to switch between assertion 
and query modes, and it may contain (in  sit) and (out) instructions so that 
the file gets loaded into its own situation.
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(DEMO filename)
If filename is a string naming an existing file, reads PROSIT expressions 
from the file one at a time as if the user typed them, but waits for the user 
to hit return before executing each one. Useful for demonstrating sequences of 
queries that show off one’s programs.
(PRINTSIT)
Prints out each of the infons, other than ! = or <- infons, which have been 
directly asserted in the current situation as opposed to being inherited from 
subsituations or subtypes.
(TRACE)
Puts PROSIT into a mode where a running trace is displayed of all queries, 
showing when queries are called, when they are exited successfully, when they 
fail, and when they are backtracked to in backward-chaining.
(DUALS)
Puts PROSIT into a mode wherein for each user query query, both the 
query and its dual (i.e., (no query)) are evaluated. If just the dual succeeds, 
PROSIT answers “no” ; if both the query and its dual succeed, PROSIT answers 
“yes and no” ; otherwise PROSIT answers “yes” or “unknown.”
EXIT
Exits PROSIT.
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